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Abstract
The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The
multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable
depending on the interactive environment in realistic situations. Instead of using the same universal value, here we consider
that the multiplication factor in each group is updated based on the differences between the local and global interactive
environments in the spatial public goods game, but meanwhile limited to within a certain range. We find that the adaptive
and bounded investment returns can significantly promote cooperation. In particular, full cooperation can be achieved for
high feedback strength when appropriate limitation is set for the investment return. Also, we show that the fraction of
cooperators in the whole population can become larger if the lower and upper limits of the multiplication factor are
increased. Furthermore, in comparison to the traditionally spatial public goods game where the multiplication factor in each
group is identical and fixed, we find that cooperation can be better promoted if the multiplication factor is constrained to
adjust between one and the group size in our model. Our results highlight the importance of the locally adaptive and
bounded investment returns for the emergence and dominance of cooperative behavior in structured populations.
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Introduction
The emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals is an
intensively studied problem [1,2]. Traditionally, the problem of
cooperation is investigated by means of the game theoretical
models of the prisoner’s dilemma for pairwise interactions, and
more generally public goods game for groups of interacting
individuals. In particular, the public goods game is abundant in
human society, e.g., protecting the global climate and avoiding
overfishing of the oceans [3–6]. In the classical public goods game
(PGG), individuals engage in multiplayer interactions and decide
simultaneously whether to contribute (cooperate) or not (defect) to
a common pool. Then the accumulated contributions by
cooperators are multiplied by a factor large than one, i.e., the
so-called multiplication factor, and finally the resulting assets are
shared equally among all group members irrespective of their
initial decision. From the perspective of each individual, defection
is clearly the rational decision to make as it yields the highest
income compared to other members. Thus, selfish individuals
should decline to contribute and attempt to free ride on the other
players’ contributions. However, if nobody decides to invest, the
group fails to harvest the benefits of a collective investment, which
drives the population into the tragedy of the commons [7].
Actually, the group is most successful if everybody cooperates, and
hence the dilemma is caused by the selfishness of individual
players.
To study the social dilemma in realistic situations, in the last
decade the risk PGG [3,4], the optional PGG [8–12], the
threshold PGG [13–17], the continuous PGG [18–20], and the
ecological PGG [21,22] have been developed based on the
classical PGG from the viewpoint of realistic societies. On the
other hand, several mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation in
the PGG, such as punishment [23–33], reward [34–38], reputa-
tion [34,37], network reciprocity [39–55] have been justified. In
particular, complex interaction networks provide a natural and
reasonable framework for studying the PGG in structured
populations. Within this framework, some aforementioned mech-
anisms, such as punishment and reward have been further studied
[28,31,32,36]. Also, some other factors have been incorporated,
such as noise [44], social diversity [39,41,46,47], and success-
driven distribution [53]. It is found that social diversity associated
with the number and the size of the public goods game as well as
the individual contribution to each game can greatly promote the
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of the system’s other feature information, e.g., game payoffs
[47,56], teaching activity [39] and preferential selection [46] in
strategy updating, have been also demonstrated to facilitate
cooperation in the PGG.
It is worth mentioning that the inhomogeneities and social
diversity about features of the system are widely existent in human
society and animal world, which can characterize the asymmetric
and different influence of individuals or interacting environments.
However, they are introduced artificially in some previous studies
mentioned above. Indeed the inhomogeneities or social diversity
can emerge spontaneously via the coevolutionary rules, since the
values of property should be not invariable, but evolve based on
the state of the system. In the context of evolutionary game theory,
the adaptive features are often coupled with the strategy evolution.
The coevolution of strategies and features of the model, e.g.,
individual social ties (for example see Refs. [57–65]), noise level
[66,67], payoff matrices [68,69], capability of strategy transfer
[71,72] and individual learning rules [73,74], have been investi-
gated in different evolutionary games, especially the prisoner’s
dilemma game (see [75] for a review). Remarkably, recently Lee
et al. further proposed a multiadaptive prisoner’s dilemma game
where both the payoff matrices and the interaction structure are
shaped by the behavior of the agents, and found that such
multiadaptive mode can result in the coemergence of hierarchical
structure and cooperation [70].
At present, we propose a coevolutionary rule in the PGG. We
consider that each interacting group has its own multiplication
factor, which evolves based on the local strategy distribution in the
group and the global strategy distribution in the whole system.
Different from the setting in some previous works [53,68–70], this
adaptive multiplication factor is used to measure the local
interacting or cooperative environment in each group, rather
than individual’s feature or the whole system’s interaction
conditions. Correspondingly, the multiplication factor represents
the feedback return of the local investment to the public good, and
a larger value of the multiplication factor enables a better
investment return [18]. Structured populations provide a compe-
tent framework to describe this local feature, which is updated
based on the local and the global level of cooperation. In the
present study, in order to focus solely on the effects of the adaptive
investment returns, we employ a square lattice where the number
of group members is fixed and always the same. Due to the
diversity of local strategy distribution, the investing cooperators
can get together in some groups, whereas in other groups they are
sparse. The inhomogeneous distribution can induce different
investment returns in different interacting groups, which may
correspond to the phenomenon of uneven regional exploitation of
the common resources in a society. For example, in some pastures
the herdsmen may over-exploit the pasture resource by adding
more and more animals to their herd, which may lead to the
gradual desertification of the grassland. Correspondingly, the
socioeconomic returns from herding in these grazing areas
decrease gradually and finally the economic losses are unavoid-
able. On the contrary, in other pastures the herdsmen may still use
the grassland resources while at the same time considering the
conservation of the ecosystem, and in such cases a higher
socioeconomic return is likely. We adopt the state of the system,
i.e., the global cooperation level, as the criterion to measure
whether the local cooperative environment is favorable or not.
Since the state of the system is evolving simultaneously, here we
prefer the dynamical global cooperation level, instead of the static
criterion in Refs. [69,70]. Moreover, in real situations the
investment return is variable, but should be somewhat limited by
external adjustment. In general, it should be limited in a certain
range [76].
In this study, we assume that the enhancement factor in each
group is updated based on the differences between the dynamical
local and global cooperation levels, and limited between the lower
Rl and the upper Ru limit. We study how the adaptive and
bounded investment returns influence the evolution of cooperation
in the spatial PGG. We find that this PGG model with the
adaptive and bounded investment returns can effectively enhance
cooperation in spatially structured populations, and that appro-
priately bounded limitations of the multiplication factor can result
in the best cooperation level. We find further that, in comparison
to the traditionally spatial PGG where only one invariable
multiplication factor which is larger than one exists in the whole
population, our proposed PGG model can produce a higher
cooperation level when each multiplication factor is limited to
change only between one and the group size.
Results
We start by presenting the results as obtained when the lower
limit of the multiplication factor Rl is equal to the opposite
number of the upper limit Ru, i.e., Ru~{Rl~Rw1. Here R is
the limit value (for the detailed definitions see the Methods
section). Figure 1(a) shows the cooperation level r at equilibrium in
the population in dependence on the feedback strength a for
different values of R. We find that when aw1 cooperation can be
promoted for larger R. To be specific, when R is small, e.g., R~4,
full defection is achieved, irrespective of the values of feedback
strength. This is because cooperators cannot survive in structured
populations if the maximum enhancement factor is not sufficiently
large [44]. When R becomes larger, e.g., R~5, the cooperation
level first increases and then slightly decreases. Subsequently, it
holds at about 0:8 with increasing a. While there is no limitation
for the multiplication factor, although the cooperation level is very
high, but a small amount of defectors can survive in the population
even for high feedback strength, e.g., a~1000. When moderate
values of R is set, e.g., R~10, full cooperation can be achieved for
high feedback strength, and the cooperation level is very similar
for other moderate values of R. To further qualify the effects of R
on the evolution of cooperation, we present r as a function of R for
different a in Fig. 1(b). Clearly, we see that for different values of a,
the cooperation level first increases dramatically from zero until
reaching the maximum value at a moderate R, then decreases
slowly with increasing R. Here, we do not show the cooperation
level in dependence on R for large a. In fact, we can still observe
the nonmonotonous dependence of r on R even for large a. These
results suggest that the PGG model with the adaptive and bounded
multiplication factor can effectively enhance cooperation in spatial
structures, and higher cooperation level can emerges if an
appropriate limitation is considered for the dynamical multiplica-
tion factor.
In order to intuitively understand the evolution of cooperation,
we show some typical snapshots of the distribution of strategy and
multiplication factor in the whole population in Fig. 2. We find
that at the beginning of evolution, cooperators can form many
small and isolated patches. But subsequently, some small compact
cooperator clusters are embedded in the sea of defectors. As time
increases, the cooperator clusters increase gradually, and finally
cooperators may expand as a single ever growing cluster [upper
row in Fig. 2]. Correspondingly, the multiplication factor in the
full cooperation group can reach the upper limit, whereas the
multiplication factor in the full defection group can reach the
lower limit [bottom row in Fig. 2]. However, the multiplication
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defectors reaches a value between the lower and upper limit.
In combination with the above investigations, let us now explain
the emergent results. Indeed, a feedback mechanism is at work
between the strategy distribution and the distribution of multipli-
cation factors in all the groups. Therefore, cooperators form
compact clusters, and these clusters can become larger and larger,
especially when the global cooperation level is not very high.
Meanwhile, the multiplication factor in the cooperators’ clusters
becomes larger and larger, which provides cooperators, especially
the ones on the boundary, with a higher payoff. Whereas defectors
also gather together, and the multiplication factor in the defectors’
clusters becomes smaller and smaller [bottom row in Fig. 2]. In
those interacting groups where the multiplication factor is
negative, it is better for the players to choose the defective strategy
such that they can have relatively higher payoffs. In a sense, this
adaptive mode can induce a double-edged sword effect on the
evolution of cooperation. However, under the social learning
defectors are inclined to learn from their neighboring cooperators.
As a consequence, the evolution of cooperation can be favored by
this locally adaptive investment return.
If there is no limitation for the adaptive multiplication factor,
due to the continuing negative feedback effects cooperators cannot
invade the defectors’ clusters, even if the feedback strength is high.
In this situation, cooperators can thrive, but cannot dominate the
whole population. When the limitation is considered for the
dynamical multiplication factor, the feedback mechanism, espe-
cially the negative feedback effects, can be effectively weakened. If
there is too much restriction for the adaptive multiplication factor,
that is, R is not very large, e.g., R~4, the multiplication factor in
Figure 1. Promotion of cooperation due to adaptive and bounded investment returns. Panel (a) depicts the fraction of cooperators r in
dependence on the feedback strength a for different values of R. Panel (b) depicts the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the boundary value
R for different values of a. It can be observed that cooperation can be promoted for large values of feedback strength, and there exist moderate
boundary values warranting the best promotion of cooperation. Here, r0~1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036895.g001
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Figure 2. Characteristic snapshots of strategy and multiplication factor distributions on a square lattice during the coevolutionary
process. Top row depicts the time evolution (from left to right) of typical distributions of cooperators (grey) and defectors (black) on a square lattice,
and bottom row depicts the corresponding time evolution (from left to right) of typical distributions of multiplication factor. Results in all panels are
obtained for a~5, r0~1, and R~10. We have checked that similar results can emerge for other parameter settings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036895.g002
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to the social learning, but this upper limit cannot warrant the
promotion of cooperation in spatial PGG even if the feedback
strength is enough high. Whereas for a larger R, e.g., R~10, the
multiplication factor in the group along the boundary reaching the
upper limit can warrant a better promotion of cooperation. Hence,
this adaptive and bounded mode for the multiplication factor can
provide a better environment for the evolution of cooperation.
However, under this adaptive and bounded mode, the
multiplication factor in some groups along the boundary cannot
rapidly become a positive and large value from a negative one
when the feedback strength is not very high [bottom row in Fig. 2].
Although the average multiplication factor r in the whole
population can reach an enough high value which can make the
cooperation level reach one in the traditionally spatial PGG [44],
the average multiplication factor along the boundary of cooper-
ators and defectors rb becomes negative as time increases
[Fig. 3(a)]. This does not provide a favorable environment for
players’ interactions. Correspondingly, the average payoffs of
cooperators and defectors along the boundary are both negative.
Moreover, as time increases the average payoff of cooperators
along the boundary is just a litter higher than the one of defectors
along the boundary, but have larger fluctuations [Fig. 3(b)]. Under
the stochastic strategy updating, defectors do not always success-
fully imitate their neighboring cooperators, but sometimes may
spread their strategy to the cooperators. As a result, cooperators
cannot defeat those defectors along the boundary, and they can
only coexist with defectors for an exceedingly long time. On the
contrary, when the feedback strength is high, by means of social
learning the multiplication factor in the group along the boundary
can have the opportunity to suddenly reach the upper limit, which
can warrant the invading of cooperative behavior into the
defectors’ clusters. Finally, full cooperation can be achieved.
In what follows, we study how cooperation evolves if the lower
limit is not the opposite number of the upper limit. Figure 4(a)
shows the typical time evolution of cooperation for fixed Rl~{5
and three different values of Ru. We find that increasing the value
of Ru can make the system reach a higher cooperation level, but
the cooperation level at equilibrium for Ru~z? is just slightly
larger than the one for Ru~10. In Fig. 4(b) we show the fraction of
cooperators as a function of time for fixed Ru~10 and three
different values of Rl. We find that increasing the value of Rl can
make the system reach a higher cooperation level. Moreover, as
time increases the fraction of cooperators first drops and then
rapidly increases, but the larger values of Ru or Rl make the
cooperation level increases faster. We also find that to have a
favorable cooperation level, it is better to set the lower limit higher
and it is not necessary to set the upper limit too high.
Finally, we study whether cooperation can be better promoted if
the adaptive multiplication factor is constrained between 1 and N
by means of a comparative investigation. Previous work has
reported that in the traditional PGG where only one invariable
multiplication factor exists in the whole population, defectors
outperform cooperators in any given mixed group for rvN [8].
We further find that in the traditionally spatial PGG, for noise
value k~1:0 cooperators can dominate the whole population only
if rw5:4, and they can survive in the system only if rw4:1,a s
shown in Fig. 5(a). It is worth pointing out that the traditionally
spatial PGG corresponds to the situation of a~0 in this present
model, where the multiplication factor in each interacting group is
fixed at r0~r. In Fig. 5(b), we set r0~Ru, and show the
cooperation level as a function of feedback strength aw0 for
Rl~1 and different values of Ruw4:1. We see that the cooperator
density varying with a displays two different behaviors: for smaller
values of Ru, e.g., Ru~4:2, the cooperation level first decreases
and then increases until reaching the maximum value. Subse-
quently, it decreases very slowly with increasing a and its value
approaches 0:8; for larger values of Ru, e.g., Ru~4:8, the
cooperation level does not change too much for small values of a,
then monotonously increases to one with increasing a. In addition,
for smaller values of Ru just a small amount of a (av0:5) is needed
to warrant a better promotion of cooperation in comparison to the
traditionally spatial PGG, and the critical amount of a becomes
smaller if the Ru is increased. For larger values of Ru, the
cooperation level for any value of aw0 is not less than the one for
a~0. In fact, the average multiplication factor in the population
for aw0 is not larger than the one for a~0, but these results
suggest that cooperation can be better promoted in comparison to
the traditionally spatial model. In addition, Fig. 5(b) shows that the
cooperation level increases with increasing the upper limit of the
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Figure 3. Time evolution of average multiplication factor and payoffs. Panel (a) depicts the time evolution of average values of
multiplication factor in the whole population and in the boundary groups, respectively. Panel (b) depicts the time evolution of average payoffs of
cooperators and defectors along the boundary, respectively. It can be observed that although the average value of multiplication factor in the whole
population is large enough for the evolution of cooperation [44], the average value along the boundary becomes negative. Correspondingly, the
average payoffs of cooperators and defectors along the boundary are both less than zero. As time increases, the average payoff of cooperators along
the boundary is a little higher than that of defectors, but has larger fluctuations. Here, a~5, r0~1, and R~10.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036895.g003
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factor. We have also verified that increasing the initial fraction of
cooperators is beneficial for the evolution of cooperation in this
model.
Discussion
In summary, we have presented a coevolutionary rule where the
multiplication factor in each interacting group is updated based on
the local strategy distribution in the group and the global strategy
distribution in the whole population, and studied its impact on the
evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. We
found that this adaptive rule for the multiplication factor can
effectively enhance the evolution of cooperation. When the
appropriate bounded limitation for the dynamical multiplication
factor is further considered, cooperation can be better promoted.
In particular, full cooperation can be achieved in the system when
the feedback strength is high enough. Also, increasing the lower
and upper limit values of the multiplication factor is favorable for
the evolution of cooperation, but high cooperation level can be
reached even if the upper limit is not very large. We further found
that even if the multiplication factor is constrained to change
between one and the group size, cooperation can be better
promoted in the adaptive mode, in comparison to the classically
spatial public goods game where the payoff parameter in each
group is fixed and identical.
The adaptive mode for the investment returns results in that a
feedback mechanism is at work, that is, the Matthew effect is
introduced. From the viewpoint of this emergent feature, our
model is related to the one proposed by Perc [53], who considered
that the reproductive success of each individual is updated by
means of the enforcement of strategy and the distribution of public
Figure 4. Cooperation promoted when the values of the lower and upper limits of the investment returns are increased. Panel (a)
depicts the fraction of cooperators in the whole population as a function of time for fixed lower limit Rl~{5 and different values of upper limit.
Panel (b) depicts the fraction of cooperators in the whole population as a function of time for fixed upper limit Ru~10 and different values of lower
limit. Increasing the values of lower and upper limit can provide more positive effects on the evolution of cooperation. Here, a~5 and r0~1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036895.g004
Figure 5. Cooperation promoted even when the investment return is updated within the interval. ½1,N . Panel (a) shows the fraction of
cooperators as a function of r0 for a~0. In this situation, the model recovers to the traditionally spatial PGG, where the multiplication factor in each
group is fixed at r0 and r~r0. For k~1:0, cooperators can survive only if r0w4:1, and they can dominate the whole population only if r0w5:4. Panel
(b) shows the fraction of cooperators as a function of a for fixed Rl~1 and different values of Ru. Initially, the multiplication factor in each interacting
group is r0~Ru. Dash lines are used to indicate the critical value of aw0 for a better promotion of cooperation in this adaptive and bounded mode
for the enhancement factor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036895.g005
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this success-driven mechanism, cooperation can be promoted.
However, defectors can have a much higher payoff even in the sea
of cooperators, and easily enforce their strategy choice to their
neighbors. Correspondingly, the superpersistent defector emer-
gences spontaneously, and cooperators cannot dominate the whole
population. The complete dominance of cooperators is elusive
even if the limitation factor about the value of reproductive success
is considered. Whereas in our model, the multiplication factor in
each interacting group is updated based on the local and global
strategy distribution, which characterizes the local investment
environment for collective interactions, rather than individual’s
personality. Also, we incorporate the limitation factor for the
dynamical multiplication factor. In this framework, cooperators
and defectors can form their own compact clusters respectively,
and correspondingly cooperators along the boundary can have a
higher payoff than the neighboring defectors. Under the social
learning, cooperators can easily spread their strategy even if the
noise level for strategy updating is large. In particular, when the
feedback strength is high, the interacting environment including
some defectors can rapidly become favorable. Thus, cooperators
can gradually invade defector’s clusters, and finally dominate the
whole population. It could be concluded that our work further
enriches the knowledgeless of coevolutionary rules in PGGs, and
importantly our spatial PGG model with adaptive and bounded
investment returns not only can promote cooperation, but also
make cooperators completely dominate the population.
It is worth emphasizing the bounded values of the multiplication
factor play a different role in the evolution of cooperation in our
model in comparison to the one in Ref. [70]. It is found that the
main results remain qualitatively if the limit value of the payoff
parameter in the prisoner’s dilemma is large enough. Moreover, it
is demonstrated that the final cooperation level strongly depends
on the values of initial payoff parameter and feedback strength in
Ref. [70]. In particular, with increasing the initial payoff
parameter, the probability that the system ends in full cooperation
state decreases. Whereas in this work, we find that the introduced
limitation factor can weaken the Matthew effect, particularly the
negative feedback effect on the unfavorable interacting groups,
which makes the limit value a crucial model parameter. The
limited negative effects can be overcome via social learning.
Hence, appropriate limitation can warrant the best promotion of
cooperation. In addition, we show that the finial cooperation level
not only depends on the the values of initial payoff parameter and
feedback strength, but also depends on the limit values. With
increasing the initial payoff parameter and the initial fraction of
cooperators, cooperation can be better enhanced when the
dynamical multiplication factor is limited. In a sense, this work
further explores the effects of adaptive and bounded game payoffs
on the evolution of cooperation.
During the coevolutionary process, the investment return in
most of interacting groups reaches the upper or lower limit due to
the feedback effects. This segregation and polarization of
investment returns occurs spontaneously over time, which is
different from the distribution in Ref. [47]. In the latter case, the
distribution of the multiplication factor is artificially introduced by
the authors and does not change during the evolutionary process.
Although the emergent values of the multiplication factor in all the
interacting groups do not display too much diversity, we find that
cooperation can be promoted in this adaptive and bounded mode.
Compared with the results in the traditionally spatial PGG model,
cooperation can be better promoted even if the multiplication
factor can only change between one and the group size.
In the present model, we consider the adaptive mode for the
multiplication factor in a group based on the local cooperation
level in the classical PGG where players just have two discrete
strategy choices C or D, and correspondingly the local cooper-
ation level only has several finite values. To make the local
cooperation level change continuously between zero and one, we
also introduce the adaptive and bounded investment returns into
the spatial continuous PGG [18–20], and still find that this PGG
with adaptive and bounded investment returns promotes cooper-
ation. We also test our model in well-mixed populations as well as
on other types of interactions networks, and still find that
cooperation can be enhanced by the proposed coevolutionary
rule. Moreover, we would like to point out that in this work we fix
the value of noise to one. In general, the qualitative behavior of the
system remains unchanged for other values of noise, although for
pairwise interactions there may exist an optimal value of noise at
which the evolution of cooperation is most successful [44]. It could
be inferred that if we can choose the optimal noise value for
strategy updating, the positive effects from social learning can be
amplified. We also believe that, cooperation can be better
promoted if we further incorporate the selection of noise level in
strategy adoption [66,67] into this adaptive and bounded mode for
the multiplication factor.
Methods
We consider the PGG on a square lattice of size L|L with
periodic boundary conditions. Each individual who is a pure
strategist can only follow two simple strategies: cooperate (C) and
defect (D). Cooperators contribute a fixed amount (here consid-
ered to be equal to 1 without loss of generality) to the public good
while defectors contribute nothing. The sum of all contributions in
each group i is multiplied by the factor ri, and the resulting public
goods are distributed among all the group members. Correspond-
ingly, the payoff of player x from the group i is
Pi
x~
ri
ni
N {1i f sx~C,
ri
ni
N if sx~D,
(
ð1Þ
where sx denotes the strategy of player x, ni denotes the number of
cooperators in the group i, and N denotes the group size. Here, we
consider the square lattice with von Neumann Neighborhood.
Accordingly, the interacting group size is fixed at N~5, and each
individual belongs to five different groups. The payoff of each
player is accumulated from the fixed five interacting groups, and
thus player x’ total payoff Px~
X
i
Pi
x.
After playing the games, the multiplication factor in each group
needs to be updated. Specifically, we assume that the multiplica-
tion factor of the group centered on player x at time tz1 is
rx(tz1)~rx(t)za½rx(t){r(t) , ð2Þ
where a controls the strength of feedback from the comparison
between the local and global cooperative environments, rx(t) is the
multiplication factor of the focal individual x’s group at time t, r(t)
is the fraction of cooperators in the whole population at time t, and
rx(t) is the local cooperation level in the group centered on x at
time t. Here, rx(t)~nx=N, where nx denotes the number of
cooperators in the group where player x is the focal individual at
time t. Moreover, we consider the limitation for the adaptive
multiplication factor following previous work [70], that is, letting
rx(tz1)~Ru if rx(tz1)wRu and letting rx(tz1)~Rl if
Adaptive and Bounded Investment Returns
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and lower limits of the multiplication factor in each group, and
they satisfy the following inequalities: RuwRl and Ruw1.I n
particular, when Ru~{Rl~R, the multiplication factor is
constrained in a symmetric interval, which is the same to the
setting in Ref. [70]. Moreover, when R~z? (no bounded
limitation for the multiplication factor) or a~0 (no updating for
the multiplication factor), the average multiplication factor in all
the interacting groups r~L{2 X
x rx(t)~r0, where r0 is the
initial value of the multiplication factor in each group.
Subsequently, each player is allowed to learn from one of its
neighbors and update its strategy. Player x adopts the randomly
chosen neighbor y’ strategy with a probability depending on the
payoff difference as
f(Py{Px)~
1
1zexp½{(Py{Px)=k 
, ð3Þ
where k denotes the amplitude of noise [77], accounting for
imperfect information and errors in decision making. Following
previous work [70], we simply set k~1:0 representing that it is
very likely that the better performing players will pass their
strategy to other players, yet it is possible that players will
occasionally learn also from the less successful neighbors.
Simulations of this spatial PGG model are performed by means
of a synchronous updating rule, using L~100 to 400 system size.
Initially, the two strategies of C and D are randomly distributed
among the population with an equal probability, and the
multiplication factor in each interacting group has the same value
r0. The key quantity for characterizing the cooperative behavior of
the system is the density of cooperators, which is defined as the
fraction of cooperators in the whole population. The system can
reach a dynamical equilibrium after a suitable transient time [78–
80]. Then the density of cooperators reaches its asymptotic value r
and remains there within small fluctuations (less than 0:01). This
asymptotic value is taken to describe the cooperation level in the
whole population, and all the simulation results are averaged over
100 different realizations of initial conditions.
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